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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to sense the needs of the community with respect to the risks the
community is willing to take.
What will result when Rouse v. Cameron is superimposed on
this commitment-release scheme is unforeseeable. It seems unlikely
that a court can force basic policy changes by the use of compulsory
processes against the hospital authorities on a case by case basis.
The money, personnel and facilities necessary for therapy are simply
not available. 4 And an order to the director of St. Elizabeth's
requiring him to provide individualized treatment for the entire
patient population would clearly be beyond the realistic limits of
judicial power. Unless there is legislative initiative, it seems that a
court will be faced with the knowledge that the only way to realize
results-as the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court with the
exclusionary rule demonstrates-is to turn patients denied therapy
loose on the community. Presumably, in individual cases, the court
will make a determination of dangerousness, and go through some
process of balancing the interests involved.
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.
Income Tax-Original Issue Discount
In a never-articulated effort to prevent tax avoidance,' the
courts have engrafted a number of judicial concepts on the statutory
definition of capital assets in spite of the all-inclusive language used
by Congress.2 By far the most famous, or infamous, of these is
the assignment of income doctrine3 which had its true beginning in
"The opinion of the American Psychiatric Association is that no tax-
supported institution in the United States can be considered adequately
staffed. U.S. SURGEON GENERAL'S AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON PLANNING FOR
MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES, PLANNING OF FACILITIES FOR MENTAL
HEALTH SERvIcES 39 (1961).
' Bowden, Assignment of Itcome Reconsidered, 20 TAxES 67 (1942).
' The Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221, defines a capital asset as all
property unless it falls within one of five specifically excluded groups. Some
courts have limited the class of preferred capital gains property by straining
to find an exclusionary category satisfied. See, e.g., Hollis v. United States,
121 F. Supp 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
'See generally, Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income, 17 TAX L. Rnv.
293 (1962). Another equally clear area of judicial legislation was estab-
lished by Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). There
the Court conceded that futures contracts which were "an integral part of
its [the company's] business" did not come within the exclusionary clauses
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Lucas v. Earl4 in 1930. The doctrine itself totally escapes definition
or delineation, but in general it can be divided into two broad areas
of concern with underlying policies and distinctions that crisscross
the whole field of income taxation. In donative transactions the
theory is to tax the donor in order to prevent the spreading of
income among the members of a group to take advantage of the
lower tax rates.' In commercial transactions the theory is to tax
the sale or exchange of an income right at ordinary income tax
rates so as to limit the range of preferred capital gains treatment
and prevent the erosion of the ordinary income tax base.6 It is in
this later category that most of the confusion has resulted.7
In United States v. Midland-Ross Corp.," the Supreme Court
was faced with conflicting opinions in the circuits as to the disallow-
ance of capital gains treatment for earned original issue discount.'
The taxpayer bought noninterest-bearing promissory notes from the
issuers at prices discounted below face value, held the notes for more
than six months, and sold them for a profit. The difference be-
tween purchase price and sale price was not influenced by market
fluctuations; it was conceded to be the economic equivalent of
interest. Two basic elements for the application of the assignment
of income doctrine were present: the character of the gain as es-
sentially equivalent to earned ordinary interest income, and the
maturity or ripeness of the accrued economic gain. 10 These two
factors taken together served to deny capital gain treatment.
of the capital asset definition, but still found that gains and losses on the
sale of these contracts were ordinary gains and losses. The capital asset
definition does not provide for a distinction between business property and
investment property, but the Court excluded these contracts on the theory
that the underlying purpose of capital asset treatment was to relieve inves-
tors from excessive hardships when they converted their investment into
cash.
'281 U.S. 111 (1930).
5 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
' Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) ; Hort v. Com-
missioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
See generally, Del Cotto, Property in the Capital Asset Definition:
Influence of "Fruit and Tree." 15 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 1 (1965); Note,
Capital Gains: Can the Confusion be Eliminated.P, 49 IowA L. Rnv. 89 (1963) ;
Note, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary In-
come, 73 YALE L.J. 693 (1964).
381 U.S. 54 (1965).
'Id. at 56 n.2.
"0 The presence of these two factors in combination caused an ordinary
income result upon the sale of a life insurance policy immediately prior to
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Using its usual definitional approach,' the Court determined
that earned original issue discount is but interest in another form12
and is outside the judicial definition of a capital asset," The gain
on the transaction was measurable and predictable and represented
simply the amount earned by the investment up to the time of sale
rather than an appreciation in value over a period of time. The
Court concluded that realization of this profit through the sale device
was essentially a substitute for payments that would, if received in
another manner, be characterized as ordinary income.' 4 The Court
relied heavily upon the cases holding that the present realization of
future ordinary income, even though cast in the form of a sale, will be
taxed at ordinary income rates.' 5 This principle is appropriately ap-
plied only by analogy because in Midland-Ross there was no sale of
future income; the income element there involved had already accrued.
Despite the factual distinction, the Court was logically correct in its
conclusion. Since the sale of a right to future ordinary income will
result in ordinary gain,'" a fortiori, if the right to such income has
its maturity despite an ostensible compliance with the statutory requirements.
Commissioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
1 The Court relied upon its usual canon of construction that the term
"capital asset" must be construed narrowly in order to afford capital gains
treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of apprecia-
tion in value accrued over a substantial period of time (citing Commissioner
v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960)) and to exclude
property representing income items or accretions to the value of a capital
asset themselves properly attributable to income (citing Hort v. Commis-
sioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) and Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 365 U.S.
260 (1958)). 381 U.S. at 57.
1 The Court illustrated the disguised interest component of original
issue discount by stating, "The $6 earned on a one-year note for $106 issued
for $100 is precisely like the $6 earned on a one-year loan of $100 at 6%
stated interest." 381 U.S. at 58.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1232 (a) (2) provides that any portion of the
gain attributable to original issue discount on notes or bonds issued after
January 1, 1955 will be treated as ordinary income. The provision does
not apply to pre-1955 notes as were involved in Midland-Ross.
" 4Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) first introduced the "sub-
stitute for ordinary income" phraseology. Since the market price of any
asset represents anticipated future profits plus the discounted value of the
proceeds expected upon resale, all gain on property transactions could be
characterized as a substitute for ordinary income. Fortunately, the courts
have not thus extended the substitute for ordinary income doctrine to its
logical extreme. But compare Donald J. Jones, P-H TAX CT. MEm!. 66-136
(1966).
" Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960);
Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commis-
sioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
"a Ibid.
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already matured, and the income has been earned, its sale will
similarly result in ordinary income.
An auxiliary ground for the result reached in Midland-Ross is
the principle that where both an income producing asset and the
right to accrued income from that asset are sold together, the pur-
chase price must be allocated between the two and only the former
is a capital asset. As the courts recognize, the capital gains section
of the Internal Revenue Code makes no distinction between an in-
come-producing asset and the income which it produces; a literal
reading of the statute would make the entire gain on the sale of the
notes in Midland-Ross capital gain."8 But an increasing number of
courts have recently been closely scrutinizing the factor of ripeness
or maturity of a taxpayer's accrued economic gain, 9 and holding
that the right to collect ordinary income from a capital asset is not
transmuted into capital gain by a sale of the capital asset together
with the right to receive the ordinary income. Clear examples of the
application of this principle can be seen in the denial of capital asset
status to the sale of a partnership interest where part of the price is
attributable to accrued ordinary income,20 the sale of a life insurance
policy shortly before it matures,2' the sale of stock upon which a
dividend has accrued,22 and the sale of an orange grove where part
of the value is attributable to an unmatured annual crop.28 In
Midland-Ross, the Court expressly approved this view, stating that
the amount received on sale or retirement of the discount note must
be broken down into its component parts and a differentiation made
depending upon the source of the proceeds.'
' Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962); Jaglom v.
Commissioner, 303 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1962)." Lubin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1964); Jaglom v. Com-
missioner, 303 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1962).
21 Increased interest in the factor of maturity is a result of taxpayers'
recent attempts to avoid the "sale or exchange rule" denying capital gain
treatment to the mere "collection" of a claim. Fairbanks v. United States,
306 U.S. 436 (1939); Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 748 (6th Cir.
1954). See generally, Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assign-
ment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAx L. REv. 1, 20 (1964).
2 Jaglom v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d. 847 (Zd Cir. 1962); Tunnell v.
United States, 259 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Snow, 223
F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1955); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937).
The same result is now reached by Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 741, 751.
21 Phillips v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960); Abram Nes-
bitt 2d, 43 T.C. 629 (1965); Boling Jones, Jr., 39 T.C. 404 (1962).
2 Brundage v. United States, 275 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 831 (1961)." Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953).
24381 U.S. at 65.
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The holding of Midland-Ross is clearly sound. Since a gift of
such income would be taxable to the donor,2" it should follow that he
cannot convert that income into capital gain through a sale or ex-
change. That Congress prefers such a result is evidenced by section
1232 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code which now expressly
adopts the Midland-Ross result when there is an original issue
discount. While obviously correct on its particular facts, the Mid-
land-Ross decision is subject to misinterpretation unless a distinc-
tion is recognized between "original issue discount" which serves
the function of stated interest, and "market discount" which reflects
a true appreciation to capital.26 Upon analysis of these latter gains,
it becomes evident that they are not "essentially substitutes" for
payments characterized as ordinary income under the gross income
definition, but represent the normal appreciation in value of a capital
asset due to market factors completely beyond the taxpayer's con-
trol. However, the Court specifically declined to pass upon the tax
treatment of gains arising from "market discount" or attributable to
fluctuations in the interest rate and market price of obligations where
there has been a discount purchase.2
The recent decision of Donald B. Jones2" overlooks the distinc-
tion between original issue discount and market discount, and hands
down a theory which, if followed, would result in an ordinary in-
come aspect to the sale of any item purchased at a discount. The
taxpayer had purchased a contingent trust remainder in a specific
dollar amount from a dealer as a speculative investment. Of course
25Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) necessarily requires that in-
come already accrued and matured at the time of gift is taxable to the
donor where the underlying obligation is not concurrently given. Rev. Rul.
275, 1958-1 Cgum. BULL. 22 (gift of back interest coupons taxable to donor).
Commissioner v. Anthony, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946). See generally
Lyon & Eustice, Assigniment of Income, 17 TAx L. REv. 293, 353-62
(1962).
"0 Market discount represents the fluctuation in price of an obligation
due to market factors once it has passed out of the hands of the original
holder, and, unlike original issue discount, has never been classified as
interest income. The distinction is discussed in Lubin v. Commissioner,
335 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1964) and Ted Bolnick, 44 T.C. 245 (1965). As
stated in United States v. Harrison, 304 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1962):
The gain realized from such a transaction (bond purchased in a
depressed market later redeemed at par) is a form of capital appre-
ciation that resembles the capital gain received when stock or real
estate is purchased and later sold at a profit, in contrast to an original
issue discount gain which represents the interest or compensation
paid for the use of money loaned.27381 U.S. at 54 n.4.
2' Donald J. Jones, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66-136 (1966).
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the purchase was at a considerable discount because of the many
risks involved. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ignored
the fact that the discount element was a product of the risks inherent
in such a purchase and remanded to the Tax Court to determine
what portion of the gain was attributable to interest income in the
nature of "issue discount." 9 The Tax Court determined that the
purchaser had received a six percent interest discount that would
be taxable as ordinary income. The result gives the commissioner
authority for asserting that in all discount purchases there is an
imputed interest element which will not qualify for capital gains
treatment. Such a theory would appear to be erroneous because it
transposes the imputed interest factor from the deferred payment
sales context"0 into the entirely distinct discount purchase context.
Further, it results in the denial of capital gain treatment to the
normal appreciation of an admitted capital asset due to market
factors, and ignores the fact that the condemnation in Midland-Ross
resulted because that discount was the economic equivalent of
interest.
R. WALTON M CNAIRY, JR.
Labor Law-Effect of 9(c)3 on Duty to Bargain
The Labor Management Relations Act, section 9(c)3, prohibits
holding a representation election in a bargaining unit "within which
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been
held."' The issue in Conren, Inc. v. NLRB2 was whether this
prohibition prevents enforcement of an order to bargain issued
because of the employer's refusal, nine and one-half months after the
union had lost an election, to grant recognition on the basis of
authorization cards signed by a majority of his employees.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the
NLRB's order to bargain, with Circuit Judge Kiley dissenting.
The majority reasoned that the affirmative reference to "election"
in 9(c)3 should not be construed to preclude representation based
" Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 483.
' 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)3 (1964).2368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3330 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 1967).
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